When secret data, such as, encrypted or otherwise protected information, is processed by a computing device, the processed results may be used to deduce the secret data, for example, by side-channel attacks, cryptanalysis, or other decryption mechanisms. For example, decryption devices may read, acquire, or measure the auxiliary or side-channel results of the secret data, which may include, for example, acoustic side-channel data and/or variation of their power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation For example, such attacks pertaining to mechanical rotary encryption machines may be described, for example, in Peter Wright, Spycatcher The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer. 
To counteract such cryptanalysis or side-channel attacks, additional protective countermeasures may be applied, for example, including, reducing the signal-to-noise ratio of the processed secret data (e.g., by applying noise generators, filters on power lines, etc.), isolating or protecting intermediate results of processing the secret data (e.g., of a statistical distribution thereof) to be independent or unconnected to the secret data. Such protective countermeasures may be achieved on a physical (e.g., or circuit) level or on an algorithmic (e.g., or logical) level
Circuit-level countermeasures, may be described, for example, in T. Popp and S. Mangard, Masked Dual-Rail Pre-Charge Logic DPA-Resistance without Routing Constraints and in D. Suzuki, M. Saeki and T. Ichikawa, Random Switching Logic: A Countermeasure against DPA based on Transition Probability Circuit-level countermeasures typically use a customized or semi-customized workflow. For example, when a circuit is synthesized, each standard cell may be replaced with one or more cells, each having a power consumption (e.g., and/or EM radiation) that may be substantially independent or unconnected with the data processed by the cell.
Algorithmic level countermeasures may be described, for example, in E. Trichina, Combinational Logic Design for AES SubByte Transformation on Masked Data, which may preemptively isolate the secret data and the processed resultant data thereof, for example, by making each intermediate result of the original algorithm statistically independent of the processed secret data.
However, circuit-level countermeasures may result in large latency and area cost and algorithmic countermeasures may betray the secrets data by exposing the additional (e g., unforeseen) intermediate results or physical artifacts of circuit computations of the secret data. Such exposure may result from what is referred to, for example, as the logical-physical gap, which is described, for example, in S. Mangard, N. Pramstaller and E. Oswald, Successfully Attacking Masked AES Hardware Implementations Furthermore, algorithmic countermeasures may include undesirable ad-hoc implementations. For example, methods described in Combinational Logic Design for AES SubByte Transformation on Masked Data may depend on a special ad-hoc structure of advanced encryption standard (AES) substitution box (S-box) transformations (e.g., an inversion in GF (256) represented as a set of operations in GF (16)). When the encryption operations do not have a useful structure (e.g., using Boolean functions having well-defined statistical properties, that are not necessarily correlated with operations system) the algorithmic countermeasures may have a substantially large logical-physical gap. For example, the algorithmic countermeasures may only mask values that depend on a substantially small number of secret data or key bits (e.g., which may control the operation of a cryptographic algorithm or mechanism) For example, the mechanisms in J. Lv and Y. Han, Enhanced DES Implementation Secure against High-Order Differential Power Analysis in Smartcards shows that for a function implemented as a look-up table, access to different entries in the table may be indistinguishable. However, such methods may be disputed in O. Acicmez, W. Schindler and C. K. Koc, Cache Based Remote Timing Attack on the AES. 
A need exists to protect secret data from side-channel attacks in a more secure manner
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